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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by §78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A This is an appeal
from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, entered December 2, 2002. Notice of Appeal was filed December 27, 2002.
This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court on March 17,
2003.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
POINT I.

WAS THE MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND ORDER OF JUNE 26,
2002 ISSUED BASED ON IATE FILING OF OPPOSING
MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT, AS IT STATES, OR WAS IT ISSUED
ON THE MERITS, AND WAS THIS IRREGULARITY IN THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT, SURPRISE OR AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHICH PREVENTED A FAm TRIAL OR HEARING?
v
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Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & light Co..
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah
1995).
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A.'s Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, to Alter or Amend Judgment and for
Relief from Judgment [R. 91-95].
POINT H.

DJL's COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNJUST
ENRICHMENT. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO DISMISS THE
COMPLAINT.

Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah
1995).
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A.'s Complaint [R. 1-4],
D.A.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [R. 43-47] and
in D.A.'s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, to
Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment [R. 95-97].
POINT m .
DID THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDER THE
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON A
MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE AN ANSWER WAS FILED RAISING
THAT DEFENSE?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co..
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah
1995).

VI
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Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A/s Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, to Alter or Amend Judgment and for
Relief from Judgment [R. 96-97].
POINT IV.

BASED ON THE FACTS STATED IN THE COMPLAINT, AND THE
TWO DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY PEADEN, THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR DA.'S CLAIMS OF QUANTUM
MERUIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is
"correctness11 since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah
1995).
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A/s Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [R. 40-41] and in D.A.'s Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, to Alter or Amend Judgment
and for Relief from Judgment [R. 95-97].
POINT V.

THE LOWER COURTS CONCLUSION OF UNCLEAN HANDS ON
THE PART OF DA. IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE OR
FINDING OF FACT.

Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah
1995).
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.A.'s Objections to Proposed
[revised] Order Dismissing Case [R. 145-147], in D.A.'s Objections to Proposed Order
Dismissing Case [R.172-175], and in D.A.'s Objections to Proposed [second revised]
Order Dismissing Case [R. 176-179].
POINT VI

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT NOT TO CONSIDER
DA.'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ASSERTING A CLAIM FOR AN
EQUITABLE LIEN.

vii
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Standard of Review: The standard of review for each of these issues is
"correctness" since there has been no evidentiary hearing, the lower court's decision was
on a motion to dismiss the complaint and the facts in the complaint must be taken as
true. The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and indulge all reasonable inferences it its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co..
823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah
1995).
Preservation of issues for review. Raised in D.AA Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint and Amended Complaint. [R. 49-55].
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to
all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury,
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from
having a fair trial.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that
is against the law.
(7) Error in law.

vm
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
Case No. 20030032-CA
GENE PEADEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action by plaintiff Development Associates, Inc. (hereinafter
f!

D.A.M) to recover from defendant Gene Peaden (hereinafter "Peaden") in quantum

meruit or unjust enrichment the reasonable value of D.A.'s costs and services in
installing and completing improvements to real property owned by Peaden or the value
of the benefit conferred upon Peaden by D.A.
Course of Proceedings
D.A. filed a complaint on March 8, 2002, alleging claims for quantum meruit
and unjust enrichment in three separate causes of action. On April 8, 2002, Peaden
filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting that D.A.'s claims were barred by the statute of
limitations of §78-12-25, U.C.A., and that D.A.'s work was for its own benefit and the
1
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benefit to Peaden was incidental.

D.A. served on Peaden its Affidavit and

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint with the Amended Complaint attached and Request for Hearing on April
25, 2002. Peaden file a Reply Memorandum, Alternative Motion for More Definite
Statement and Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint on May 30, 2002.

The lower court, without a hearing and without

considering D.A.'s Affidavit and Memorandum in Opposition, entered a Minute Entry
Decision and Order on June 27, 2002, granting Peaden's Motion to Dismiss.
On July 7, 2002, D.A. filed a Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To
Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment, with supporting affidavit and
memorandum, and after opposing and reply memoranda, a hearing on that motion was
scheduled for September 23, 2002.
Disposition in the Lower Court
At the hearing on September 23, 2002, the lower court disingenuously
denied that it had dismissed the complaint for late-filing of opposition and proceeded
to hear the merits of the Motion to Dismiss. It granted that motion from the bench.
Peaden's attorney prepared a proposed Order Dismissing Case which contained
numerous statements of facts and conclusions which were not in the record before the
court and had not been found or concluded by the lower court. After D.A. filed three
separate objections to the proposed Order Dismissing Case, the lower court, on
December 2, 2002, entered the Order Dismissing Case, which contains unauthorized
findings and conclusions. This appeal followed.

2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
(a) On March 8, 2002, plaintiff D.A. filed a complaint for unjust
enrichment against defendant alleging the following facts [R. 1-4]:
(1) Plaintiff is and has been the owner of numerous residential lots
in The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions located at approximately 13800 South
and 4800 West in Salt Lake County which were unimproved at the time they were
acquired, having no approved roads, curb & gutter, and no connections to water, sewer,
power, fuel and telephone systems, and for which it was impossible to obtain building
permits for the construction of homes thereon.
(2) Defendant was and is the owner of Lots 320, 322 and 334, The
Foothills Plat "B" Subdivision, and Lots 379, 380 and 555, The Foothills Plat "C"
Subdivision, which were similarly unimproved and for which it was impossible for
defendant to obtain building permits for the construction of homes thereon.
(3) In order to obtain building permits on its lots, plaintiff was
required by Salt Lake County and later Riverton City to install and complete all
subdivision improvements, not just for the lots owned by it, but for all lots located
within The Foothills Plats MB" and "C" Subdivisions.
(4) Before proceeding to install and complete the subdivision
improvements, plaintiff contacted defendant and made defendant aware of the
requirement to install and complete all improvements in the entire subdivisions and
requested defendant to agree to reimburse plaintiff for his share of the costs of such

3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

improvements prorated to the lots owned by him if plaintiff installed and completed
such improvements so that defendant could obtain building permits for his lots.
(5)

Defendant acknowledged the need to install such

improvements and that such improvements would benefit him and increase the value
of the lots owned by him and encouraged and requested plaintiff to proceed with the
installation of such improvements.
(6)

Plaintiff thereafter completed all such improvements as

required by Salt Lake County and later Riverton City for the benefit of all lots in The
Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions at a total cost of $2,381,302 for Plat "B" and
$3,134,044 for Plat "C". These amounts, prorated to the 159 lots in Plat "B", equals
$14,977.00 per lot in Plat "B", and to the 200 lots in Plat "C, equals $15,670.22.
Defendant's prorata share of those costs for his six lots is $91,941.66.
(7) Defendant requested plaintiff to install the improvements
which would also improve his lots.
(8) Plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate it for such
improvements.
(9) Defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff expected
to be so compensated.
(10) Defendant is obligated to reimburse plaintiff the reasonable
value of plaintiff's services in installing and completing the improvements, which plaintiff
alleges is $91,941.66, plus fifteen percent for overhead and developer fees, together with

4
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interest thereon at the legal rate, both before and after judgment, from the time such
services were performed until paid.
(11) Defendant has received the benefit of six fully improved lots
in The Foothills Plats "B" and "C Subdivisions on which building permits can now be
obtained.
(12) Defendant had and has an appreciation or knowledge of the
benefit conferred upon him.
(13) It would be unjust for the defendant to retain that benefit
without paying for it.
(14) Plaintiff is entitled to recoverfromdefendant the value of the
benefit conferred which plaintiff alleges is $45,000 per lot or a total of $270,000.
(15) Defendant has received, accepted and retained benefits which
in equity and justice belong to plaintiff.
(16) Defendant should be required to pay for the benefits received
by him, which plaintiff alleges is $45,000 per lot or a total of $270,000.
(b) The summons/complaint were served on Peaden March 18, 2002.
[R. 101,12].
(c) Peaden filed his Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum
presenting matters outside the pleadings, on April 8, 2002, at 6:51. p.m. [R. 5-23].
(d) D.A. served its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss [R.39-48], Affidavit of Steven R. Young in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
[R.34-37], Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint with the Amended Complaint

5
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attached [R.49-55] and Request for Hearing [R.56-57] on both motions on Thursday,
April 25, 2002. The originals were apparently not recorded as filed until Monday, April
29,2002.
(e) Peaden's attorney's secretary telephoned D.A.'s attorney on May
14, 2002, and requested an extension of time until Monday, May 20, 2002, to file a reply
to Peaden's memorandum and Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. That
request was granted. [Marsh Affidavit, 115, R. 102].
(f) On Tuesday, May 21, 2002, Peaden's attorney's secretary again
telephoned D.A,'s attorney and requested another extension of time until Friday, May
25, 2002. That request was granted. [Marsh Affidavit, 116, R. 102].
(g) Peaden's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss [R.
58-71], Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement [R. 72-74], Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and in Support
of Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement [R. 75-79] were filed on May 30,
2002, at 5:51 p.m. and mailed to D.A.'s attorney the same day.
(h) Peaden filed a Notice to Submit for Decision [R. 80-82] on June
14, 2002, stating that oral argument had been requested by one or more of the parties
and referencing Peaden's Motion to Dismiss and Alternative Motion for More Definite
Statement and memoranda in support thereof and D.A.'s memoranda and affidavit and
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint.
(i) D.A. filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Peaden's Motion for
More Definite Statement on June 25, 2002 [R. 85-87].

6
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(j) The Court entered its Minute Entry Decision and Order, dated
June 26, 2002, on June 27, 2002 [R. 83-84]. In that order the lower court stated:
Before the Court is Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss dated April 8, 2002 and Defendant's Alternative
Motion for More Definite Statement filed on May 30,2002, and
submitted on its June 14, 2002 Notice to Submit for Decision.
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having noted
no timely opposition being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE
APPEARING, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. This
constitutes the Order of the Court.
(k) On July 7, 2002, D.A. filed a Motion to Amend Findings, For New
Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment [R.88-89], with
supporting affidavit [R. 101-104] and memorandum [R. 90-100],
(1) On July 23, 2002, Peaden filed his Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and
for Relief From Judgment [R. 111-122].
(m) On July 25, 2002, D.A. filed its Reply Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and For
Relief from Judgment [R. 123-126].
(n) D.A.'s Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or
Amend Judgment and For Relief from Judgment was scheduled to be heard on
September 23, 2002 [R. 136]. At that hearing the lower court stated, disingenuously,
that it had not dismissed the case, on June 26, 2002, based on late filing of D.A.'s
Memorandum and Affidavit (as the court stated in its Minute Entry and Order of that

7
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date) but rather on the merits and that it would proceed to hear Peaden's Motion to
Dismiss on the merits and granted that motion from the bench.
(o)

On October 14, 2002, Peaden submitted a proposed Order

Dismissing Case which contained numerous proposed "findings" and "conclusions" and
"orders" which were not supported in the record and were not actually found or
concluded by the lower court in its ruling from the bench. Among the proposed orders
was an order of expungement of the Notice of Interest and an Order quieting title to
the property in Peaden.
The so-called "undisputed facts" included:
(i) a statement that Peaden "did not agree or represent to the plaintiff
that he would pay for the improvements made or to be made by the plaintiff," which
is contrary to the allegation in H7 of the Complaint and 1f7 of Mr. Young's affidavit,
which must be taken as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss;
(ii) a statement that plaintiff represented to the lower court that the
Notice of Interest "was recorded by the plaintiff before the improvements to plats B and
C of the sub-division were made," and that plaintiffs counsel represented that "plaintiff
would have previously removed its Notice of Interest... had such request been made
pursuant to the wrongful lien statute because the improvements had not been made to
numerous lots at the time the Notice of Interest was filed," neither of which finds
support in the record and neither of which is true;

8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(iii) a statement that the reportfromRiverton City "reflects that many
of the improvements to Foothills plat B were made before the end of 1997," which is
not true. At most the report reflects that "some" improvements had been made.
(p) DA. filed Objections to Proposed Order Dismissing Case [R. 145147] on October 23, 2002, objecting to anyfindingsof fact outside of those contained
in the complaint or in the affidavit submitted by D.A., objecting to some of those
specificfindingsas not supported in the record, objecting to specific conclusions of law
as not supported by the findings nor the facts and as contradictory to others, and
objecting to proposed orders which would grant affirmative relief to Peaden, which was
inappropriate on a Motion to Dismiss.
(q) On October 25,2002, Peaden submitted a revised proposed Order
Dismissing Case [R. 150-159] which still contained numerous inappropriate "findings,"
"conclusions" and "orders."
(r) On October 29, 2002, D.A. filed Objections to Proposed [revised]
Order Dismissing Case [R. 172-175] making the same objections as before.
(s) On October 30,2002, Peaden submitted a second revised proposed
Order Dismissing Case [R. 162-171] deleting one of the proposed orders granting
affirmative relief.
(t) On November 4, 2002, D.A. filed Objections to Proposed [second
revised] Order Dismissing Case [R. 176-179] making the same objections as before.

9
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(u)

After a hearing on D.A/s objections to the proposed order

prepared by defendant's counsel, the lower court entered an Order Dismissing Case on
December 2, 2002. [R. 182-191].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.

WAS THE MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND ORDER OF JUNE 2<S,
2002 ISSUED BASED ON LATE FILING OF OPPOSING
MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT, AS IT STATES, OR WAS IT ISSUED
ON THE MERITS, AND WAS THIS IRREGULARITY IN THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT, SURPRISE OR AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHICH PREVENTED A FAIR TRIAL OR HEARING?
The lower court's order of June 26, 2002, was based on late filing of

opposing memorandum and affidavit. At a later hearing the court denied that the late
filing was the basis of its decision, even though the order so stated, and stated that it
had ruled on the merits and, after some argument, ruled from the bench dismissing the
case on the merits. This irregularity in the proceedings of the court, the abuse of
discretion and the surprise involved in the court's obvious failure to consider the merits,
then stating disingenuously that it did consider the merits thus prejudging the matter
before it heard the arguments and carefully reviewed the affidavits and memoranda,
with the natural disinclination to change the decision which it just announced,
constitutes grounds for reversal of the dismissal.
POINT H.

DA.'s COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNJUST
ENRICHMENT. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO DISMISS THE
COMPLAINT.
A motion to dismiss accepts all of the facts stated in the complaint as true.

The complaint clearly set forth all of the required elements of unjust enrichment,
quoting the language of the Utah cases which define a cause of action for unjust
10
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enrichment and alleging the facts which support that cause. Since those are the only
facts before the court, it was error for the lower court to dismiss the complaint.
POINT HI.
DID THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDER THE
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON A
MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE AN ANSWER WAS FILED RAISING
THAT DEFENSE?
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which is normally raised
in the Answer to a Complaint. The facts as to when the cause of action arose and
whether the statute of limitations was tolled by defendant's absence from the state, as
well as other matters, do not appear on the face of the complaint and may not be
known until discovery is conducted.

In order to justify a dismissal, it must be

demonstrated that there is no set of facts under which the plaintiff might succeed. The
court did not and could not have known all possible sets of facts when it dismissed the
complaint.
POINT IV,

BASED ON THE FACTS STATED IN THE COMPLAINT, AND THE
TWO DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY PEADEN, THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR DA.'S CLAIMS OF QUANTUM
MERUIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENTThe only evidence before the lower court was contained in an affidavit

submitted by D.A. which stated that improvements in the subdivision were installed
after 1997 and continuing to the present because all improvements had not yet been
completed. There was nothing in the documents submitted by Peaden from which the
court could find that all improvements were installed during or before 1997. Thus, the
court could not properly determine the date on which the cause of action arose and
could not, therefore, conclude that the statute of limitations had expired.

11
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POINT V.

THE LOWER COURTS CONCLUSION OF UNCLEAN HANDS ON
THE PART OF DA. IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE OR
FINDING OF FACT.
The only evidence before the lower court were the facts stated in the

complaint and a copy of the Notice of Interest. There was no evidence before the court
upon which a finding or conclusion of "unclean hands" could be based. Rather, the only
evidence indicated that Peaden had been benefitted in the amount of approximately
$270,000 by the improvements installed by D.A. for which Peaden refused to pay. That
makes D.A. the "white knight" in this case and Peaden the person with "unclean hands."
Equity is totally on the side of D.A. and the court's conclusion of "unclean hand" must
be reversed.
POINT VI.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT NOT TO CONSIDER
DA.'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ASSERTING A CLAIM FOR AN
EQUITABLE LIEN.
The lower court did not reach this issue because it dismissed the complaint

but on remand the lower court should be directed to consider the Amended Complaint
so that fair and complete relief may be given to D.A.

12
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WAS THE MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND ORDER
OF JUNE 26, 2002 ISSUED BASED ON LATE FILING OF
OPPOSING MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT, AS IT
STATES, OR WAS IT ISSUED ON THE MERITS, AND WAS
THIS IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COURT, SURPRISE OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHICH PREVENTED A FAIR TRIAL OR HEARING?
The lower court, on June 26, 2002, issued an Order granting Peaden's
Motion to Dismiss. That Order recites that the court only had before it Peaden's
Motion to Dismiss and his Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement and then
stated "having noted no timely opposition being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE
APPEARING, the Motion to Dismiss is granted." The clear meaning of this Order was
that the court did not consider the Affidavit and Memorandum filed by D.A. and that
the basis of the decision was "no timely opposition being filed," rather than a decision
on the merits of the motion. While this issue was later technically resolved when the
lower court stated, at the hearing on September 23, 2002, on D.A.'s Motion to Amend
Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and For Relief from Judgment,
that it had not dismissed the case for late-filing of opposition but on the merits and
would proceed to hear the merits again at that time, the lower court was disingenuous
in so stating.1 This is important only because once the court has stated that it did

1

In its Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or Amend Judgment and
For Relief from Judgment, D.A. clearly pointed out that dismissal for late-filing was
improper, including the following grounds: (1) that the court had no knowledge of whether
the parties had agreed to an extension of time to file the opposing documents; (2) no
objection or motion to strike the opposing documents had been filed by Peaden, which is

13
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dismiss the case on the merits, even though it had not considered the merits, it has
taken a position on the merits before it heard argument thereon and carefully examined
the memoranda and affidavits and was highly unlikely to change that position. This was
confirmed to the undersigned when the lower court immediately ruled from the bench
in denying all aspects of the Motion to Amend Findings, For New Trial, To Alter or
Amend Judgment and For Relief From Judgment. The lower court's failure to consider
the merits will become apparent as we review those merits in the following points.
The point here is that the lower court's handling of this matter constitutes
irregularity in the proceedings, surprise or abuse of discretion which prevented a fair
trial or hearing on the merits of the case. D.A. filed a Motion for New Trial in the
lower court under Rule 59(a), U.R.CP. That motion was based on subdivisions (1) and
(3) of that Rule, for procedural reasons, and on subdivisions (6) and (7), for substantive
reasons. The procedural basis of that motion will be discussed in this point and the
substantive reasons in the following points.

usually a waiver of the late-filing; (3) a just determination of the matter required the court
to consider all opposing documents which it had before it; (3) D.A. had filed a Request for
Hearing [R. 56] on the Motion to Dismiss; (4) Rule 4-501(3), Rules of Judicial
Administration, requires a hearing "where the granting of a motion would dispose of the
action . . . on the merits11 "unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue . . . has been authoritatively decided" and
the court made no such finding; (5) Peaden had filed a Notice to Submit for Decision [R.
80-81] specifically making reference to the opposing documents, which was the means by
which the Motion to Dismiss was brought to the lower court's attention; and (6) surprise at
the court's failure to consider opposing documents in the file and the dismissal of the case
without a hearing.
With all due respect to the lower court, it is the opinion of the undersigned that
the lower court was embarrassed by summary dismissal without considering the merits and
simply stated that it had not dismissed for late-filing but on the merits.
14
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Peaden's Motion to Dismiss presenting matters outside the pleadings
was, pursuant to Rule 12(b), to be treated as a motion for summary judgment under
Rule 56. A Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial following a summary judgment is
"procedurally correct." Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson. 797 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah
App. 1990): Moon Lake Electric Assoc, v. Ultrasystems Western Constr., 767 P.2d 125,
127 (Utah App. 1988), in which it was stated:
"[t]he concept of a new trial under Rule 59 is broad enough to
include a rehearing of any matter decided by the court without
a juiy." 11 A. Wright & C. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure §2804 (1973).
D.A. was, therefore, entitled to a new trial or hearing on this matter upon the following
grounds provided in Rule 59(a):
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, . • . or any order of the
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair
trial.
The court's Minute Entry Decision And Order, which granted the motion
to dismiss, was apparently based upon the Court's statement that "no timely opposition
being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING,...." An affidavit and memorandum
in opposition had been filed and, although it was timely served on Peaden's attorney on
Thursday, April 25, 2002,2 it was apparently not received by the clerk of the court until

2

Under Rule 4-501(l)(B), Rules of Judicial Administration, a memorandum in opposition
to a motion is due "within ten days after service of a motion," and, Under Rule 6(a),
U.R.C.P., "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed, without reference to any
additional time provided under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." Thus, April 13,14,20 and
21, Saturdays and Sundays, would be excluded and 3 days would be added, pursuant to Rule
6(e), U.R.C.P., extending the time to respond to the April 8 Motion to Dismiss until April
15
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the following Monday, making the filing only two days late. The court, of course, has
no knowledge as to whether an extension of time had been granted by Peaden's
attorney to respond to the motion. On that ground alone, it was irregular or an abuse
of discretion for the court to disregard the memorandum and affidavit which had been
filed in opposition to the motion and which were in the file and available to the Court
at the time the Minute Entry Decision was made and entered. Furthermore, since the
Rules of Civil Procedure are to be "liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action," Rule 1(a), U.R.C.P., and the purpose of the
Rules of Judicial Administration "is to bring order to the manner in which the courts
operate . . [and] n o t . . . to create or modify substantive rights of litigants, . . ." Scott
v. Majors, 980 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah App. 1999), it was irregular and an abuse of
discretion to deny D.A. of its substantive rights to pursue its claims by dismissing its
complaint. It was further irregular and an abuse of discretion for the court to find
"GOOD CAUSE APPEARING" when no basis for the good cause is stated or appears
in the record.
Ordinarily, discrepancies and untimeliness in the filing of affidavits or other
documents are waived unless objected to by the opposing party. No objection having
been filed by Peaden, it was irregular and an abuse of discretion for the court to grant
the motion to dismiss on its own. By granting the motion to dismiss, the court has
prevented D.A. from having a fair trial or consideration of its claims. Fair consideration
of D.A.'s claims requires that the responses to Peaden's motion be reviewed by the

25.
16
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court. Those responses included an affidavit setting forth specific facts and legal
authorities relevant to the arguments raised in the motion to dismiss. Without a
consideration of those facts and authorities, D.A. was denied a fair consideration of its
claims.
The undersigned is aware of the previous direction by the judges in the
Third District that default certificates and judgments not be entered until a few days
after the expiration of the time forfilinga response to a complaint to discourage those
who would take advantage of a late filing by only a few days. It would seem that the
same reasoning should apply to a late filed memorandum. In fact, the late filing of a
memorandum is not comparable to the failure to file an answer where, under the rules,
a default may be entered. Even in that situation, as stated in Heathman v. Fabian &
Clendenin. 14 U.2d 60, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962):
No one has an inalienable or constitutional right to a judgment
by default without a hearing on the merits. The courts, in the
interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and
complete opportunity for a hearing on the merit of every case.
Even in the case of a default judgment, the court is sometimes obligated to hold a
hearing and take evidence and the party in default must be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard under Rule 55(a)(2), U.R.C.P. There is greater reason to
apply that principle here.
Whether or not the court considers the affidavit and memoranda in
opposition to the motion to dismiss, the court must make a ruling on the merits based
on the facts and the law. The opposing affidavit and memoranda offer guidance to the
court with respect to those facts and the law. Without those affidavits and memoranda,
17
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presumably the court would seek the same information from the file or by research.
Thus, consideration of the opposing affidavit and memoranda is only helpful to the
court.
Most importantly, Peaden's motion to dismiss was brought to the Court's
attention by means of his Notice to Submit for Decision, dated June 14, 2002, which
stated that "Oral argument has been requested by one or more of the parties" and
further referred to the motions, memoranda and affidavits which had been submitted
by both parties in support of or in opposition to the motion. That being the means by
which the matter was brought to the court's attention, the court should have, at least,
considered the motions, memoranda and affidavits referred to therein and, at most,
scheduled a hearing thereon, as was the expectation of both parties. Under Rule 4501(3), Rules of Judicial Administration, a request for hearing "where the granting of
a motion would dispose of the action or any claim in the action on the merits with
prejudice" "shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues governing the
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided." The court did not
find the matter to be frivolous or authoritatively decided. Therefore, the request for
a hearing should have been granted. Furthermore, under the same rule, "when a
request for a hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party." This was
not done. Under this rule, a hearing should have been scheduled and the failure to do
so, and to consider the documents in the file and referred to in the Notice was irregular

18

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or an abuse of discretion which prevented plaintiff from having a fair hearing on the
merits of its claims.
2. Surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against
D.A.'s attorney was surprised by the Court's refusal to consider the
memoranda and affidavit filed in opposition to the motion to dismiss. His experience
in matters of this kind in the past is that courts accept and consider all documents filed,
whether or not timely filed, unless the opposing party objects or files a motion to strike
the late filed documents. When that has occurred, the filing of a motion under Rule
6(b), U.R.C.P., to accept and consider the late filed documents has given the court an
opportunity to consider all relevant factors including whether a ruling will deprive a
party of the just determination of his cause, the prejudice to either party, excusable
neglect, and whether the information in the documents would be helpful to the court
in ruling on the merits of the motion. When a request for hearing has been filed and
granted, the parties have the opportunity to inform the court about these matters. The
undersigned does not recall ever being successful in getting a court to refuse to consider
untimely documents filed by another party even in egregious cases and this is the first
time, in his experience, that a court has dismissed a case without considering documents
on file relevant to the motion to dismiss. Had he known that the court would even
consider such a thing, a motion to enlarge the time for filing or a motion to consider
the late-filed documents would have been filed.
This irregularity in the proceedings of the court, the abuse of discretion and
the surprise involved in the court's obvious failure to consider the merits, then stating
19
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disingenuously that it did consider the merits thus prejudging the matter before it heard
the arguments and carefully reviewed the affidavits and memoranda, with the natural
disinclination to change the decision which it just announced constitutes grounds for
reversal of the dismissal.
POINT II
DA's COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE
COURT TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT.
A motion to dismiss a complaint accepts all of the facts stated in the
complaint as true. The standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim requires the Court to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power &
Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Russell v. Standard Corp.. 898 P.2d 263,
264 (Utah 1995).
The question, then, is do the facts stated in DA's complaint state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.

The complaint has asked for relief in three

alternative causes of action, one for quantum meruit-contract implied in fact, one for
quantum meruit-contract implied in law and one for unjust enrichment. These are
three alternative claims for unjust enrichment based upon the decided cases in the State
of Utah. The principle of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment is well-recognized in
Utah law. In Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County. 734 P.2d 910 (1987), the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
Unjust enrichment is a doctrine under which the law will imply
a promise to pay for goods or services when there is neither an
20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

actual nor an implied contract between the parties. fThe
promise is purely fictitious and is implied in order to fit the
actual cause of action to the remedy." Rapp v. Salt Lake City.
527 P.2d 651, 654-5 (Utah 1974). Three elements must be
present before unjust enrichment may serve as a basis of
recovery: There must be (1) a benefit conferred on one person
by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee
of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without
payment of its value.
See also Berrett v. Stevens. 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984), which recognizes the same
principle. Breitling Bros, v. Utah Golden Spikers. Inc.. 597 P.2d 869 (Utah 1979),
stated that the gravamen of quantum meruit "is that one should be required to pay for
benefits he has accepted." That case was remanded to determine what benefit was
actually conferred. Some of the benefits which would qualify for unjust enrichment
were identified by the Utah Supreme Court in the earlier case of Baugh v. Parley. 112
Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 337-8 (Utah 1947). Those benefits include "improvements to
land," benefits which "increase the intrinsic value of the land," give the benefited party
"legal rights which he did not previously have," "increase the value of his estate," "give
him a position of greater security" or "remove a legal liability."
The Court of Appeals, in Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987),
has given its own explanation of the principle by setting forth two branches:
Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or
unjust enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit. A quasicontract is not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in
restitution. See 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §19, at 44, 46
(1963). The elements of a quasi-contract, or a contract implied
in law, are: (1) the defendant received a benefit; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3)
under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant
21
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to retain the benefit without paying for it. See Berrett v.
Stevens. 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984) (using the term "unjust
enrichment"). The measure of recovery under quasi-contract,
or contract implied in law, is the value of the benefit conferred
on the defendant (the defendant's gain) and not the detriment
incurred by the plaintiff, see First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d
683, 687 (Utah 1980), or necessarily the reasonable value of the
plaintiffs services.
A contract implied in fact is the second branch of quantum
meruit. A contract implied in fact is a "contract" established by
conduct. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §5 comment
a (1981). The elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the
defendant requested the plaintiff to perform work; (2) the
plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or her for
those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have
known that the plaintiff expected compensation.
The Supreme Court, however, has continued to use its own definition of the
doctrine from its prior cases, that is, "(1) a benefit conferred; (2) an appreciation or
knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d
1234, 1248 (Utah 1998). In that case the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
finding of unjust enrichment where plaintiffs had improved land for their own benefit
but the defendants also realized a benefit therefrom. In so concluding, the Court
stated:
First, the facts underlying an unjust enrichment claim are often
complex and vary greatly from case to case. Indeed, by its very
nature, the unjust enrichment doctrine developed to handle fact
situations that did not fit within a particular legal standard but
which nonetheless merited judicial intervention. [1244-5].
. . . the remedy of restitution is not confined to any particular
circumstance or set of facts. It is, rather, a flexible, equitable
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remedy available whenever the court finds that "the defendant,
upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of
natural justice and equity" to make compensation for benefits
received. [1245; quoting from Murdock-Bryant Constr.. Inc. v.
Pearson. 146 Ariz. 48, 703 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Ariz. 1985)].
Unjust enrichment law developed to remedy injustice when
other areas of the law could not. Unjust enrichment must
remain a flexible and workable doctrine. [1245].
. . . a court need not find that the defendant intended to
compensate the plaintiff for the services rendered or that the
plaintiff intended that the defendant be the party to make
compensation. This is because the duty to compensate for
unjust enrichment is an obligation implied by law without
reference to the intention of the parties. What is important is
that it be shown that it was not intended or expected that the
service be rendered or the benefit conferred gratuitously, and
that the benefit was not "conferred officiously." [1246; quoting
from Murdock-Bryant Constr.. above, at 1203].
As to the second element, the claimants plainly did not confer
the services officiously. "Officiousness means interference in the
affairs of another not justified by the circumstances under which
the interference takes place." Restatement of Restitution § 2
cmt. a (1937). Thus, an officious person is one who "thrust[s]
benefits upon others." Id. Here, the claimants did not interfere
or thrust benefits on the UEP. To the contrary, the UEP
encouraged the claimants to improve the land. [1246].
Finally, the claimants did not confer their services gratuitously.
One renders services gratuitously if at the time they were
rendered, there was no expectation of "a return benefit,
compensation, or consideration."
Webster's New Int'l
Dictionary 992 (3d ed. 1961); see also 66 Am.Jur.2d,
Restitution § 26 (1973). [1246-7].
Although the Utah Supreme Court made some of the above statements with respect
to Arizona law, it stated that "we find the analysis to be much the same" with respect
to Utah law and arrived at the same conclusion under Utah law.
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A review of the complaint in this case will show that the first and second
causes of action satisfy the elements of unjust enrichment as defined by the Court of
Appeals in Davies v. Olsen and all three causes of action satisfy the elements of unjust
enrichment as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Jeffs v. Stubbs. A benefit has
been conferred on Peaden. The benefit clearly falls within the list approved by the
Supreme Court, that is, his land has been improved, the intrinsic value of his land has
increased from a few hundred dollars to over $50,000 per lot, the value of his estate has
been increased, and because he can now obtain a building permit on his lots and could
not do so before, a legal right has been conferred upon him which he did not have
before or a legal liability has been removed. Peaden knew or should have known of the
benefit conferred. He was contacted in advance and encouraged plaintiff to proceed
knowing of the benefit to him in doing so. In fact, he knew of the work being done and
did nothing to prevent it which, in Jeffs v. Stubbs, at 1247, precludes one from claiming
that the work was done gratuitously or officiously. Because D.A. benefitted only from
the improvements to its lots and received no benefit from the improvements to
Peaden's lots and because the benefit to Peaden is so substantial, it cannot reasonably
be argued that the benefit to him was incidental. The ability of Peaden to obtain
building permits on his lots is of absolutely no benefit to D.A. and that fact alone has
increased the value of Peaden's lots from a few hundred dollars each to over $50,000
each. That increase in value of Peaden's lots is of no benefit to D.A. but is a
substantial benefit to Peaden. It is of interest to know that every other lot owner in the
Foothills Subdivisions (with only one exception, who resides outside the state) has
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recognized the benefit to them of these improvements and has paid for those benefits.
Peaden is the only holdout.
The complaint alleges that Peaden "requested [D.A.] to install the
improvements which would also improve his lots" [Complaint, II 10, R. 3], that D.A.
"expected [Peaden] to compensate it for such improvements" [Complaint, H 11, R. 3],
and that Peaden "knew or should have known that [D.A.] expected to be so
compensated" [Complaint, 1f 12, R. 3]. Thus, the Court of Appeals' definition of a
contract implied in fact, one branch of quantum meruit, is clearly stated in the
complaint. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that Peaden "received the benefit of six
fully improved lots in The Foothills Plats "B" and "C" Subdivisions on which building
permits can now be obtained [Complaint, If 15, R. 3], Peaden "has an appreciation or
knowledge of the benefit conferred upon him" [Complaint, If 16, R. 3], and "it would be
unjust for the defendant to retain that benefit without paying for it." [Complaint, If 17,
R. 3]. Thus, the Court of Appeals' definition of a contract implied in law, the other
branch of quantum meruit, is also clearly stated in the complaint.
In addition, the complaint alleges that a benefit was conferred on Peaden
[Complaint, 1f1f 8 & 15, R. 2-3], that Peaden "had and has an appreciation or knowledge
of the benefit conferred upon him" [Complaint, If 16, R. 3], and Peaden "has received,
accepted and retained benefits which in equity and justice belong to [D.A.]" [Complaint,
If 20, R. 3]. Thus, the Supreme Court's definition of unjust enrichment is clearly stated
in the complaint. All of these allegations must be taken as true for purposes of a
motion to dismiss. Therefore, the lower court's conclusion of law that the complaint
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fails to state a claim for unjust enrichment [Order Dismissing Case, 1118, R. 187] is in
error.
POINT ffl
DID THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDER
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS ON A MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE AN
ANSWER WAS FILED RAISING THAT DEFENSE?
The Utah Supreme Court, in reversing a summary judgment granted on a
motion to dismiss, has stated "it is generally not well advised to treat a motion to
dismiss as one for summary judgment." Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d
119, 122 (Utah 1977). In fact, in order to justify a dismissal, it must be demonstrated
that there is no set of facts under which the plaintiff might succeed. Olson v. ParkCraig-Olson. Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1360-1 (Utah App. 1991). There are several sets of
facts upon which plaintiff could succeed in avoiding the application of the statute of
limitations and recovering under the unjust enrichment set forth in plaintiff's complaint.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the general rule that "affirmative
defenses, which often raise issues outside of the complaint, are not generally
appropriately raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Tucker v. State Farm
Mutual 53 P.3d 947, 950 (Utah 2002). The Court then specifically held, at 951:
Thus, in the narrow instance where a plaintiff's complaint
describes events which establish when a statute of limitations
begins to run but fails to explicitly set forth the relevant date on
which those events occurred, a defendant may raise a statute of
limitations defense in a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of
the Utah Rules of civil Procedure, provided that the trial court
treats the motion as one for summary judgment, thus giving all
parties the "reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion. . . . Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b).
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In this case, D.A. was not notified that the Court intended to treat the motion as one
for summary judgment and did not have a reasonable opportunity to present all
material pertinent and could not do so until discovery had been conducted relating to
Peaden's presence in the State. It was impossible for the lower court to determine if
the statute of limitations had been tolled by Peaden's absence from the State. [See §7812-35, U.C.A.]. There was no way for the court to determine, based on the facts stated
in the complaint and the two documents submitted by Peaden, whether any of D.A.'s
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Since the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense, these questions do not arise until after Peaden has filed an answer
to the complaint.
For these reasons, it was improper for the lower court to treat the motion
to dismiss raising the issue of the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations as one
for summary judgment.
POINT IV
BASED ON THE FACTS STATED IN THE COMPLAINT,
AND THE TWO DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY PEADEN,
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR DA.'S
CLAIMS OF QUANTUM MERUIT OR UNJUST
ENRICHMENT.
Peaden's Motion to Dismiss is not supported by an affidavit asserting any
facts which could be considered as evidence as to the application of the statute of
limitations. The only "evidence" relied upon in the Motion to Dismiss is a Notice of
Interest which makes no reference to the dates when any improvements were
completed or to be completed and a Pre-Building Permit Report from Riverton City
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which expressly states that some roads had not been asphalted and nowhere does it
state that all required improvements were completed. Furthermore, that report applied
only to lots in Plat B of The Foothills Subdivision and makes no reference to any lots
in Plat C. Because the Notice of Interest does not give any dates for the installation
of improvements, it was error for the lower court to conclude that the statute of
limitations commenced to run no later than the date of that Notice of Interest.
[Conclusion of Law 19, R. 187]. There is simply no evidence to indicate that the statute
of limitations has run with respect to D.A.'s claim. Furthermore, even if some of the
improvements installed by D.A. were barred by the statute of limitations, other
improvements were not and there was no way for the Court to determine, based on the
facts stated in the complaint and the two documents submitted by Peaden, what may
be barred and what is not. It is also impossible for the Court to determine if the statute
of limitations has been tolled by Peaden's absence from the State. [See §78-12-35,
U.C.A.]. Since the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, these questions do
not arise until after Peaden has filed an answer to the complaint asserting that defense.
Peaden's Motion to Dismiss claimed that all of the improvements installed
by D.A. were all installed in 1997. While some improvements were installed in 1997,
many were installed in 1998 and 1999 and there is still work to be done consisting of
repair to sidewalks damaged during construction and installation of street lights.
[Young Affidavit, HIT 2, 4-5, R. 34-5]. Therefore, all of the improvements required to
be installed by the City of Riverton have not yet been completed and the statute of
limitations could not possibly have expired with respect to those improvements.
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POINT V
THE LOWER COURTS CONCLUSION OF UNCLEAN
HANDS ON THE PART OF DA. IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
ANY EVIDENCE OR FINDING OF FACT.
At the hearing on September 23,2002, the lower court stated that it was not
relying on the equitable claim of unclean hands asserted by Peaden in granting the
Motion to Dismiss. Nevertheless, Peaden's attorney included a conclusion of unclean
hands in the Order Dismissing Case [Conclusion of Law 20, R. 187] and, over the
objections of D.A. [Objections, 11 7, R. 178], the court signed the order including that
conclusion. The asserted basis for that conclusion is the "undisputed fact that the
plaintiff intentionally recorded its Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County
Recorder on defendant's property in January 1997 even through (sic) plaintiff knew,
according to representations to the Court, that the improvements for which the Notice
of Interest were recorded had not been made at that time." There is absolutely no
evidence before the court to support such a finding and such a representation was not
made to the court. [Objections, If 4, R. 177]. Again, the only "evidence" before the
court on a motion to dismiss are the facts stated in the complaint, which are all taken
as true for purposes of such a motion. There is no statement in the complaint that
improvements had not been made at the time of the Notice of Interest. Therefore,
there is no evidence upon which such a finding and conclusion could be based.
Furthermore, it is a huge jump to conclude that D.A. had "unclean hands"
just because it recorded the Notice of Interest. In fact, it is blatantly hypocritical for
Peaden, who has received a huge benefit from D.A., by the improvements which
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increased the value of his lots by approximately $270,000, which he refuses to pay for,
to claim that D.A. has "unclean hands." He should be praising and thanking D.A. for
conferring such a benefit on him. Instead, he is disingenuously "miffed" because they
recorded a Notice of Interest against all of the improved lots, including his, which has
since been released and did not, in any way, prevent him from selling his lots. He has,
incidentally, sold at least two of his lots at a huge gain. It is his hands that are unclean
and those hands are now slinging their mud at D.A. in an attempt to cover up his greed
and inequitable conduct.
Afindingand conclusion of "unclean hands" surely would require the taking
of some evidence from which such a finding could be made. It is impossible for the
court to make such afindingfrom the facts stated in the complaint, which are the only
facts before the court.
The lower court's unsupported conclusion of unclean hands must be set
aside and the decision based thereon reversed.
POINT VI
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT NOT TO
CONSIDER DA.9S AMENDED COMPLAINT ASSERTING A
CLAIM FOR AN EQUITABLE LIEN.
Because the lower court dismissed the case, it did not consider the
Amended Complaint filed by D.A. which asserted an additional claim for an equitable
lien against the lots owned by Peaden. That Amended Complaint should be considered
by the court upon remand so that fair and appropriate relief may be granted to D.A.
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CONCLUSION
The lower court's Minute Entry Decision and Order of June 26, 2002, was
irregularity in the proceedings, surprise or an abuse of discretion which prevented a fair
trial or hearing. D.A.'s complaint stated a cause of action for unjust enrichment and
it was error for the lower court to dismiss it. The lower court also committed error
when it considered the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations on a motion to
dismiss before an answer was filed raising that issue. There is insufficient evidence
before the court to determine the applicability of the statute of limitations and it was
error for the court to dismiss the complaint on that ground. The lower court further
erred in concluding that D.A. had "unclean hands" since there was no evidence of any
kind before the court which would support such a conclusion. This case should be
reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits, including the claims in the Amended
Complaint.
DATED this J3J_ day of October, 2003.
Respectfully submitted,

Ralph J. Marsh 1
Attorney for Appellant
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
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By
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Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant Gene Peaden

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

ORDER
DISMISSING CASE

Plaintiff,
V.

GENE PEADEN, an individual,
Defendant.

Civil No. 020902121
HON. WILLIAM B. BOHLING

A hearing came on before the Court in connection with the underlying motion to
dismiss filed by defendant Gene Peaden in the above-captioned case. Ralph Marsh appeared
on behalf of Development Associates, Inc. and Steven W. Call appeared on behalf of Gene
Peaden. The Court had made its ruling in favor of defendant Peaden without a hearing but no
order was signed and entered. After the Court made its minute entry, the plaintiff filed a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

motion to alter and amend the Court's ruling. The motion was based on plaintiffs
understanding that the Court's ruling was based on the premise that plaintiffs pleadings were
not timely filed. At the hearing before the Court, the Court clarified and defendant's counsel
confirmed, that the issue of timeliness was not being challenged, and that the Court's ruling
should be based upon the merits of the issues raised in defendant's moving papers. The parties
agreed that the Court would hear argument on the substantive issues raised in the defendant's
moving papers.
Now, the Court having considered the defendant's motion to dismiss, the memorandum
of points and authorities filed in support and opposition thereto, the Affidavit of Steven R.
Young (the plaintiffs president), the reply memorandum of points and authorities filed by
defendant Peaden, and having heard the representations and argument of counsel and for cause
appearing, the Court hereby makes itsfindingsof uncontroverted facts, conclusions of law,
and order of dismissal as follows.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are determined to be undisputed based upon the allegations made in
the pleadings, the certified documents filed with the Court, the affidavit of Steven R. Young
and/or the representations of counsel made at the hearing before the Court.
1.

Defendant Peaden owns lots 320, 322, and 334 of the Foothills Plat "B" according

to the official plat thereof, as recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, and lots
<
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(hereinafter the "Notice of Interest'1). A copy of the Notice of Interest is attached as Exhibit B to
defendant's support memorandum.
7.

The Notice of Interest was recorded against several lots in the Foothill Sub-

Division including but not limited to all of defendant's Property. The Notice ofInterest
provides, in part, as follows:
The undersigned, Development Associates, Inc., hereby claims and asserts an
interest in subject property pursuant to their improvements and developments,
which benefit the following described property.
8.

The plaintiff represented to the Court at hearing that the foregoing Notice of

Interest, which was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office, was recorded by the
plaintiff before the improvements to plats B and C of the sub-division, (which include the lots at
issue in this action), were made.
9.

Plaintiffs counsel further represented to the Court at the hearing that the plaintiff

would have previously removed its Notice of Interest against defendant's Property had such
request been made pursuant to the wrongful lien statute because the improvements had not been
made to numerous lots at the time the Notice of Interest was filed.
10.

The certified report from Riverton City reflects that many of the improvements to

Foothills plat B were made before the end of 1997.
11.

Defendant Peaden has never made any payment to the plaintiff for any of the

alleged improvements made by the plaintiff to the development.
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CONCLUSIONS OFLAW
12.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-3-4 and/or § 78-33-1.
13.

The Court has in rem jurisdictional over the Property which is the subject of this

action because the Property is located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
14.

Venue is proper in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7, because the Property, which is the subject of this action, is located in
•.?•

Salt Lake County, Utah.
15.

The Court has considered the sworn affidavit of Steven Young and other

extraneous materials, and therefore, defendant's motion may be considered a motion for
summary judgment. However, even without the consideration of the affidavit and other
extraneous materials, there are grounds which would sustain dismissal of all or part of plaintiff s
complaint based upon the uncontested documents from the public record which were attached as
exhibits to defendants support memorandum.
16.

As such, the Court should make an order dismissing plaintiffs complaint against

defendant Peaden on several alternative grounds for failing to state a claim for relief under Utah
law.
17.

First, the Restatement of Restitution § 106 provides that "[a] person who,

incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to the protection or the improvement of his own
things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby entitled to contribution."
5
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18.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has failed to state

a claim for unjust enrichment against defendant Peaden under Utah law. The indirect benefits
which defendant received from plaintiffs work were merely incidental benefits, which occurred
when the plaintiff undertook to make improvements to the development for plaintiffs own
business purposes.
19.

Even if the complaint stated a claim for relief for unjust enrichment and/or an

implied in fact contract, the four-year statute of limitations for any such claim has likely expired
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25, which requires that such a claim be brought within four
years. The facts are undisputed that defendant never made any payment to the plaintiff, and
therefore the statute of limitations would have begun to run when the plaintiff first had a claim
for relief that could have been alleged against the defendant for the improvements. Such time
should have been no later than the date upon which the plaintiff filed its Notice ofInterest on the
public records of Salt Lake County, and in no event later than the date when the improvements
were made.
20.

Even if the complaint stated a claim for unjust or an implied in fact contract and

the claims were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the plaintiff is not entitled to a
claim in equity against defendant Peaden because of its unclean hands. This is based upon the
undisputed fact that the plaintiff intentionally recorded its Notice ofInterest with the Salt Lake
County Recorder on defendant's Property in January 1997 even through plaintiff knew,
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according to its representations to the Court, that the improvements for which the Notice of
Interest were recorded had not been made at that time.
21.

Utah law does not allow for the filing of a notice of interest against another's

property for alleged incidental improvements made thereto. The Court concludes that the proper
method for filing a lien against another's property for improvements to real property should be
made against such property pursuant to the procedures provided for in Utah Mechanics Lien Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 etseq. The Court concludes and plaintiff admitted to the Court at
hearing that it did not comply with the Act.
22.

For the reasons set forth above plaintiffs Notice of Interest was not lawfully

recorded against defendant's Property.
ORDER OF JUDGMENT
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts and conclusions of law, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1.

Defendant's motion to dismiss, which was converted (at least in part) to a motion

for summary judgment, is hereby granted;
2.

Plaintiffs motion to alter and amend this Court's ruling is denied;

3.

Plaintiff motion for leave to file its amended complaint is moot, the Court having

considered and ruled upon the merits of plaintiff s claims;
4.

Costs are hereby awarded to defendant Peaden pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure; and
7
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5.

This Order is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be signed and entered by

the clerk of the Court.
DATED this ^

day of

\Jad2W^1

2002.

BY THE COURT:

HON. WILLIAM B. BOHLING
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Ralph B. Marsh
Attorney for Development Associates, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

5*.day of November, 2002, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing proposed [third revised] Order Dismissing Case was served by U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Ralph J. Marsh
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

673074/swc
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of

, 2002, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing [third revised] Order Dismissing Case was mailed by U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Steven W. Call
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Ralph J. Marsh
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

673074/swc
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH

DEVELOPMENT ASSOC., INC.,
A Utah Corporation,
MINUTE ENTRY DECISION
And ORDER
CASE NO. 020902121

Plaintiffs,

GENE PEADEN, an Individual

Defendant,

JUDGE:

WILLIAM B. BOHLING

Dated

June 26,2002

Before the Court is Notice to Submit Defendant's Motion to Dismiss dated
April 8,2002 and Defendant's Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement filed on
May 30. 2002, and submitted on its June 14, 2002 Notice to Submit for Decision.
Having reviewed all pertinent pleadings and having noted no timely opposition
being filed, AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. This
constitutes the Order of the Court

Dated this

WBB/mtr

viuW >

_ day of

WMamB.Bohling r.:<*$£
District Judge
i \ #~
v.
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2002.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 020902121 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

J^f day of

pjvu.

NAME
STEVEN W CALL
ATTORNEY DEF
36 SO STATE ST
SUITE
1400
P.O. BOX 45385
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841450385
RALPH J. MARSH
ATTORNEY PLA
800 MCINTYRE BUILDING
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
, 20 £r2-r-

Out
Deputy Court Clerk
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RALPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 531-8300
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO AMEND
FINDINGS, FOR NEW
TRIAL, TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT AND FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 020902121
GENE PEADEN,
(Judge William B. Bohling)
Defendant.
Plaintiff hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, to amend the findings, pursuant to Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P., for a new
trial, pursuant to Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P., to alter or amend the judgment, and pursuant
to Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., for relief from the judgment on the grounds set forth in the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings, for New Trial, To Alter or
Amend Judgment and for Relief From Judgment filed herewith.
DATED this _£_ day of July, 2002.
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

Ralph J. Marsh
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
On the
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day of July, 2002, I mailed a true and correct copy of the

foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
AND FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, to the following:
STEVEN W. CALL
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 841

i

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

